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Political Broadcasts
of the media,70 and physically unattractive candidates would still be at a
disadvantage. Political parties would still need to choose ". . . able and
personable candidates who [can] sell themselves, because TV has changed
the course of campaigns. ' 71 But, the unfair advantage now held by wealthy
candidates would be significantly lessened, and the evasion of political issues
would become costly.
John Clifford
Kugler v Romain: Price Unconscionabiity and the
Consumer Class Action-Are They Compatible?
The substantive doctrine of price unconscionability, embodied by implication
in Section 2-3021 of the Uniform Commercial Code, and the procedural
class action device, 2 are juridical pronouncements, capable of mitigating, to
some extent the present shortcomings of consumer protectionism. The New
Jersey Supreme Court, in Kugler v. Romain,3 has recognized the expedience
of joining of the two concepts by granting class-type relief based on a finding
of price unconscionability. This article will analyze that decision and dis-
cuss the relationship among the principles it embraces.
70. McLuhan is quoted as saying that in 1960, when Nixon's use of the media was
less than expert, "without TV, Nixon had it made." But in 1968 Frank Shakespeare
said "without television, Richard Nixon would not have a chance." McGiNNIss 35,
58.
71. See Leonard Hall's March 1, 1955 statement to the National Federation of Re-
publican Women in C. THOMPsON 137, supra note 69.
1. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A: 2-302 (1962) provides:
(1) If the court as a matter of law finds the contract or any other clause of
the contract to have been unconscionable at the time it was made the court
may refuse to enforce the contract, or it may enforce the remainder of the
contract without the unconscionable clause, or it may so limit the application
of any unconscionable clause as to avoid any unconscionable result.
(2) When it is claimed or appears to the court that the contract or any
clause thereof may be unconscionable the parties shall be afforded a reason-
able opportunity to present evidence as to its commercial setting, purpose,
and effect to aid the court in making the determination.
All states except California and North Carolina have enacted this provision.
2. FED. R. Civ. P. 23.
3. 58 N.J. 522, 279 A.2d 640 (1971).
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Lower Court Decision
The initial action was brought against the nonresident defendant, Romain,
individually and trading as Educational Services Co., by the Attorney Gen-
eral4 of New Jersey, pursuant to the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act,5
which in pertinent part provided:
The act, use or employment by any person of any deception,
fraud, false pretense, false promise, misrepresentation, or the
knowing, concealment, supression or omission of any material fact
with intent that others rely upon such concealment, suppression,
or omission, in connection with the sale or advertisement of any
merchandise or with the subsequent performance of such person
as aforesaid, whether or not any person has in fact been misled,
deceived, or damaged thereby, is declared to be an unlawful
practice . . .
The defendant was engaged in the sale of a "Complete Ten Year Educa-
tional Program" by means of home solicitations consciously directed at low-
income urban areas. The wholesale cost of the "educational package" was
found to be approximately $35-$40. The cash price for the same was fixed
at $249.50, while the time price, (since virtually every consumer bought on
time), was fixed at $279.95, payable in 24 equal installments of $11.507.
Evidence was adduced at trials that the maximum retail price that should
have been charged was $108-110.9 Similar evidence was presented as to
the quality of the "educational" materials. In the plain and simple words
of the plaintiff's expert witness, the books were "useless."' 10
The Attorney General sought injunctive and restorative relief for the 24
4. The action was specifically brought by the Office of Consumer Protection:
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-5.6 (1970).
5. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-1, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:17B-5.6. For a good dis-
cussion of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act see Comment, Consumer Remedies-
Statutes-A New Approach, 1 SETON HALL L. REv. 208 (1970).
6. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (Supp. 1970). See note 18 infra.
7. Curiously, the time price of $279.95 less a $9.00 deposit was payable in 24
equal monthly installments of $11.50 or $276.00.
The inflated cash price enabled the seller to come within the legal limits on interest
proscribed by N.J. STAT. ANN. § 17:16C-41 (Supp. 1970), which provides that the
interest charge shall not exceed $10 per $100 per year. The maximum interest allow-
able on a principal balance of $249.50 for two years is $49.90 (10% of $249.50 times
two) while the amount in fact charged was $29.50. Thus by setting a cash price in
excess of $229.10, the seller assured himself of procuring time sales within the legal
limits without sacrificing a gross profit margin of $239 ($279 less $40).
8. 110 N.J. Super. 470, 266 A.2d 144 (Chancery Div. 1970).
9. Brief of the Attorney General at 8. Expert testimony of Dr. Soloman Flink,
M.A., Ph.D., Chairman of Dept. of Economics, Graduate School of Business Admin-
istration, Rutgers University, established that the price charged by the defendant was
"exhorbitant".
10. Id. at 9.
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consumers who testified and for all those consumers similarly situated. Spe-
cifically, he prayed for (1) injunctive relief pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann.
§ 56:8-811 enjoining the defendant from engaging in those practices prohibited
by Section 2 of the Act; (2) a declaration that the contract price was fraudu-
lent per se and unconscionable under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2 or N.J. Stat.
Ann. § 12A:2-302 respectively; (3) rescission of all contracts between pur-
chasers listed and those consumers "similarly situated;" (4) restorative and
remedial orders pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-8,12 for the benefit of the
24 consumers who testified and those "similarly situated," and an order en-
joining the defendant from enforcing any of the contracts entered into with
consumers listed in the complaint and all those consumers "similarly situated;"
(5) assessment of civil penalties pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-13,14.
The trial court found that the defendant had violated Section 2 of the
New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act only with respect to having fraudulently
induced the 24 testifying consumers into executing installment sales con-
tracts.' 3  The judgment required the defendant to restore all monies paid by
eight consumers who testified; enjoined the defendant from engaging in de-
ceptive and fraudlent practices; assessed civil penalities in the amount of
$2400 ($100 per each offense); and enjoined the defendant from institut-
ing any action arising from the contracts against any of the 24 consumers
who testified at the trial. 14
Although the trial court's judgment was generally favorable to the Attor-
ney General, the court specifically limited relief to those consumers who
testified and thereby denied a class action-type judgment to all those "sim-
ilarly situated", on the grounds that (1) while the sales price appeared
"excessive," such "exorbitance" did not per se constitute a fraud within the
purview of N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-1; 15 and, (2) the Attorney General
lacked standing to assert the unconscionabiity of a contract or clause thereof
pursuant to N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-302,1" stating unconscionability ".
is strictly a matter of private concern. ..,17
11. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-8 (1964) provides:
[TIhe court may make such orders or judgments as may be necessary
to prevent the use or employment by any person of any prohibited practices,
or which may be necessary to restore to any person in interest any monies or
property, real or personal which may have been acquired by means of any
practice herein declared to be unlawful.
12. Id.
13. 266 A.2d at 148.
14. Id. at 153.
15. Id. at 149.
16. See note 1 supra for the text of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-302 (1962).
17. 266 A.2d at 150.
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New Jersey Supreme Court Decision
Judge Francis, writing for a unanimous court, held that unconscionability,
undefined by the code, is an "amorphous concept" to be liberally construed
and "must be equated with the concepts of deception, fraud, false pretense,
misrepresentation, concealment and the like, which are stamped unlawful
under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-2.' 11
Specifically, he held that a sales price of two and one-half times the rea-
sonable market price of goods which were "practically worthless" was "ex-
orbitant" and as such constitutes unconscionability within the purview of the
Consumer Fraud Act. The court could now rest its decision on Section 2
of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act reasoning:
If therefore, in this case the price charged for the educational
package is so exorbitant as to be unconscionable, Section 2 makes
it unnecessary to decide whether the Attorney General could
maintain a class action for all similarly affected consumers based
solely upon violation of Section 2-302, the unconscionability clause
of the Uniform Commercial Code. 19
While the decision was expressly based on Section 2, a realistic interpreta-
tion of the opinion led one to the conclusion that in the absence of Section 2,
the same result could be reached solely under N.J. Stat. Ann. § 12A:2-302.
The court cites with approval, State of New York by Lefkowitz, Attorney Gen-
eral v. ITM, Inc.20 in which the Attorney General of New York, pursuant
to the New York Consumer Protection Act,2' attacked certain consumer re-
tail sales contracts, procured through high pressured sales tactics and a refer-
ral scheme, on the alternative grounds of price unconscionability. The New
York Supreme Court declared:
It is clear that these excessively high prices constituted 'uncon-
scionable contractual provisions' within the meaning of Section 63,
subdivision 12, of the Executive Law. . . . But even if the
prices charged were not unconscionable per se they were uncon-
scionable within the context of this case.
22
18. 279 A.2d at 651-52; N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-2 (Supp. 1970) has been amended
to include "unconscionable commercial practice" as an unlawful act.
19. 279 A.2d at 652.
20. 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966).
21. Sec. 63, Subdiv. 12 provides:
Whenever any person shall engage in repeated fraudulent or illegal acts ...
in the carrying on, conducting or transaction of business, the Attorney Gen-
eral may apply ...for an order enjoining the continuance of such business
activity . . .and the court may award relief applied for or so much thereof
as it may deem proper. The word 'fraud' or 'fraudulent' as used herein shall
include ... unconscionable contractual provisions.
22. 275 N.Y.S.2d at 320-21.
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This court consequently finds these contracts are unconscionable
within the meaning of both the Uniform Commercial Code, Sec.
2-302 subdivision 1 and Executive Law, Sec. 63 subdivision
12. ... 23
The trial court, in the instant case, read ITM in its narrowest possible con-
text, distinguishing it from Kugler on the grounds that Section 63 subdivision
12 of the New York Executive Law "specifically prohibits 'unconscionable
contractual provisions'. ' 24  On the contrary, the court in ITM upheld the
standing of the Attorney General to invoke Section 2-302 of the Uniform
Commercial Code by alleging price unconscionability on behalf of the con-
suming public.
By imputing unconscionability into the scope of Section 2, the court was
able to utilize the price unconscionability rationale as a means of establish-
ing the illegal aspect common to all of the sales contracts, i.e., the exorbitant
price. Having identified the common unlawful element, the court was not
barred from providing broad class-type relief by invalidating all sales con-
tracts executed by consumers "similarly situated" and granting the neces-
sary restorative relief required by N.J. Stat. Ann. § 56:8-8.25
Price Unconscionability
The court in Kugler has demonstrated the willingness of the New Jersey
judiciary26 to implement needed consumer reform through the oft scoffed-
at27 doctrine of price unconscionability embodied in UCC 2-302.28  Exces-
sive price considered either as one element of unconscionability or as an un-
23. Id. at 322.
24. 266 A.2d at 150.
25. See note 11 supra for text of N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-8 (1964).
26. With the exception of New York and New Jersey, the case law development
under U.C.C. § 2-302 has been relatively sparse. For an excellent synopsis and dis-
cussion of the case law see West, Unconscionability: A State by State Survey, 5 CLEAR-
INGHOUSE REV. No. 2 (1971).
27. A chilling judicial reception was given the doctrine in the District of Columbia.
See Patterson v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 277 A.2d 111 (D.C. Ct. App. 1971),
and Morris v. Capital Furniture and Appliance Co., 280 A.2d 775 (D.C. Ct. App.
1971). See also, Zuckman, Walker-Thomas Strikes Back: Comment on the Pleading
and Proof of Price Unconscionability, 30 FED. B.J. 308 (1971) [hereinafter cited as
Zuckman].
28. For the leading cases prior to Kugler acknowledging that an exorbitant price
can be equivalent to an unconscionable contractual term, see American Home Im-
provement, Inc. v. MacIver, 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964); State ex rel. Lefko-
witz v. ITM, Inc., 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966); Frostifresh Corp. v.
Reynosco, 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966); rev'd on damages only 54
Misc. 2d 119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (Sup. Ct. 1967); Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez,
53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1967); Toker v. Perl, 103 N.J. Super. 500, 247
A.2d 701 (1968); Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264
(1969).
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conscionable contractual term in and of itself has been the subject of much
debate. 29  The excessive price in Kugler was seemingly utilized in a dual
capacity. On one hand, it was considered as an element of unconsciona-
bility in that it "raises a strong inference of imposition,' 30 with respect to the
testifying consumer "representatives." On the other hand, it was considered
unconscionable in and of itself in order to rescind contracts entered into by
non-testifying consumer class members. The consumer "representatives"
were able to prove fraud by testifying to the misrepresentations, and thus
invoke the sanctions of the Consumer Fraud Act. The non-testifying con-
sumer class members, as such, could not. Notwithstanding, the court
granted class relief by considering the exorbitant price term as an uncon-
scionable provision, presumptive of fraud, and common to all sales con-
tracts entered into by consumers "similarly situated."
"Procedural unconscionability," 31 i.e., abuse in the contract formation
process such as fraud, violations of truth-in-lending statutes and referral
schemes, has been present in most cases before a finding of price uncon-
scionability could be made. In Kugler, the procedural abuse took the form
of fraudulent representations made as to the quality of the "educational"
materials. Fraud was therefore easily established as to the consumers who
testified. However, it is unlikely that the court would reach the same result
based only on proof of gross price disparity.
All decisions involving price unconscionability, save one,3 2 have con-
tained elements of procedural abuse. American Home Improvement v.
Maclver, 3 the first case to cite Section 2-302, and thus spawn the doctrine
of price unconscionability,3 4 involved a violation of New Hampshire's truth-
29. Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 485 (1967) [hereinafter cited as Leff]; Ellinghaus,-In Defense of Un-
conscionability, 78 YALE L.J. 757 (1969); Spanogle, Analyzing Unconscionability Prob-
lems, 117 U. PA. L. REv. 931 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Spanogle]; Murray, Uncon-
scionability: Unconscionability, 31 U. Prr. L. REv. 1 (1969); Left, Unconscionability
and the Crowd-Consumers and the Common Law Tradition, 31 U. Prrr. L. REv.
349 (1969); Speidel, Unconscionability Assent and Consumer Protection, 31 U. PITr.
L. REv. 359 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Speidel]; M. Shanker & M. Abel, Consumer
Protection Under Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 29 Oio ST. L.J. 689
(1968); Comment, Unconscionable Sales Prices, 20 ME. L. REv. 159 (1968); Zuck-
man, supra note 27.
30. 279 A.2d at 653.
31. Leff 489-508.
32. Jones v. Star Credit Corp., 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969).
33. 105 N.H. 435, 201 A.2d 886 (1964).
34. For pre-code case law recognizing gross price disparity as grounds for equitable
relief, see Miami Tribe of Oklahoma v. United States, 281 F.2d 202 (Ct. C. 1960);
Hume v. United States, 132 U.S. 406 (1889); Campbell Soup Co. v. Wentz, 172 F.2d
80 (3d Cir. 1949). See also 3 J. POMEROY, EQUITY JURISPRUDENCE §§ 926-28
(5th ed. 1941), discussing cases where equitable relief was granted based on gross
price disparity absent other inequitable factors.
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in-lending statute' 5 and the presence of a gross disparity between price and
"value." In Maclver, the seller had agreed to furnish and install 14 com-
bination windows and one door and "flincoat" the side walls of the defen-
dant's house at a cost of $1759. The defendant executed an installment
contract which boosted the total time sales price to $2568.60 payable over
five years. After minimal performance by the seller, he instituted an action
to enforce the contract. Although truth-in-lending violations did exist, the
Court took pains to void the contract on "independent" grounds of uncon-
scionable price disparity stating:
Inasmuch as the defendants have received little or nothing of
value and under the transactions they entered into they were pay-
ing $1609 for goods and services valued at far less, the contract
should not be enforced because of its unconscionable features.
. .. 'It has long been the law in this state that contracts may
be declared void because unconscionable and oppressive...,a6
This (dictum?) has led one court to cite Maclver for the proposition that
gross price disparity alone may constitute unconscionability.3
7
The New York court in ITM "8 was also faced with various forms of pro-
cedural abuses such as fraud and illegality (lottery), each sufficient to
justify the injunctive relief granted. Notwithstanding the fraudulent prac-
tices perpetrated on consumers, the court implied that retail prices varying
from two to six times a seller's cost are unconscionable and therefore render
the contracts unenforceable.
In Central Budget Corp. v. Sanchez 9 the statutory requirement 40 that no-
tice of assignments must be in at least eight point bold type was violated.
However, the court denied the plaintiff-assignee's motion for summary judg-
ment on an automobile sales contract, holding that the defendant buyers
were entitled to present evidence on the question of unconscionability, 41 and
that "excessively high prices may constitute unconscionable contractual pro-
visions. .,"42 citing ITM, Williams, and Macver. The assignor-seller had
35. N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. ch. 399-B:2 (1961).
36. 201 A.2d at 889.
37. 275 N.Y.S.2d at 321. One commentator forewarned: "Maclver may mark the
beginning of a possible trend towards voiding contracts under Sec. 2-302 where a great
disparity exists between price and value." Comment, Unconscionability-The Code,
the Court, and the Consumer, 9 B.C. IND. & COM. L. REv. 367, 371 (1968).
38. 52 Misc. 2d 39, 275 N.Y.S.2d 303 (1966).
39. 53 Misc. 2d 620, 279 N.Y.S.2d 391 (1967).
40. N.Y. PERS. PROP. LAW §§ 302(9), 403(3)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1970).
41. See also Milford Finance Corp. v. Lucas, U.C.C. Rep. Serv. 801 (Mass. App.
Dist. 1970).
42. 279 N.Y.S.2d at 392. Prof. Murray in his article, Unconscionability: Uncon-
scionability, appearing in 31 U. Prrr. L. REV. 1 (1969), criticizes the judicial reasoning
1972]
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sold the defendants a 1959 Buick automobile for $939.75 plus finance
charges of $242.47. The buyer was compelled to spend $570 in repairs
less than one week later, which was clearly indicative of a breach of war-
ranty.
The courts in Kugler, Maclver, ITM, and Sanchez, all presented alterna-
tive statutory grounds authorizing the relief granted. Frostifresh v. Rey-
nosco 43 and Toker v. Perl,44 although fraught with procedural abuse, did
not contain alternative statutory grounds upon which relief could be condi-
tioned. Frostifresh became the first case to rest its decision exclusively on
Section 2-302, utilizing for the first time the third remedy provided therein. 45
Suit was instituted by the seller to recover an amount allegedly due on an
installment contract for the purchase of a refrigerator-freezer. The hus-
band and wife defendants were Spanish-speaking people, hoodwinked by
the seller's Spanish-speaking salesman into executing an installment con-
tract, written in English and completely unintelligible to them. A referral
scheme, similar to the one used in ITM, convinced the buyers that their
purchase would not cost them anything, since commissions on similar sales
made to their neighbors were to be purportedly credited to their account.
The sale price for the refrigerator-freezer was $1145.88 which included a
$245.88 credit charge. The wholesale cost to the defendant was $348.00.
The lower court found the contract "shocking to the conscience" and limited
recovery to cost stating: "The service charge . . . almost equals the price
(cost $348) of the appliance. 46 Finding the trial court's remedy a bit harsh,
the appellate court upheld the finding of unconscionability but allowed the
seller to recover reasonable profit, necessary trucking and service charges,
and reasonable finance charges. 47
in Sanchez and its predecessors, admonishing:
This kind of approach is virtually indistinguishable from common law form
of action thinking . . . . No thought is given to why such cases may give
rise to the activation of the unconscionability concept. This kind of judicial
reasoning, all too prominent, precludes the development of a rational struc-
ture. Id. at 66.
43. 52 Misc. 2d 26, 274 N.Y.S.2d 757 (1966), rev'd on damages only, 54 Misc. 2d
119, 281 N.Y.S.2d 964 (1967).
44. 103 N.J. Super. 500 (Law Div. 1968), a!f'd in part 108 N.J. Super. 129 (App.
Div. 1970).
45. Supra note 1. See also Toker v. Westerman, 8 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 798, 799
(1970), where the court found the sale of a refrigerator-freezer at two and one-half
times its reasonable retail value, "shocking and therefore unconscionable" under
Section 2-302. The court limited recovery to the reasonable value of the item.
46. 274 N.Y.S.2d at 759.
47. Both courts, in finding unconscionability, aided the seller by allowing him to
recover the value of his product. The courts could have refused enforcement simply on
the grounds of illegality (lottery). See Spanogle, supra note 29, at 965 n.169.
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In Toker, the husband and wife buyers were deluded into believing the
food plan they agreed to included the price of a freezer ($799.95). Finding
the maximum retail value to be $300, the court refused to enforce the con-
tract on the grounds that a price-value differential of greater than two and
one-half times is unconscionable, citing Sanchez.
To date, the strongest holding that gross price disparity absent procedural
abuse, constitutes unconscionability is found in Jones v. Star Credit Corp.,4s
where the plaintiff-buyers sought to reform a sales contract for the purchase
of a freezer unit. The court found the maximum retail value to be $300.
The defendant had charged $900 ($1439 with credit charges and sales tax).
After holding that the contract was a contract for sale and not a refinancing
agreement, despite the words, "refinance of freezer" typed on the letter-
head, the court held that the contract was unconscionable, giving the price
value disparity ($900-$300) the "greatest weight," citing Maclver, ITM,
and Frostifresh.
49
Jones, unlike Kugler and its ancestors, did not involve procedural abuse in
the contract formation process, such as deception, referral schemes, or non-
disclosure which alone could have been sufficient grounds upon which to
grant relief. Fraud was not present, nor did the court deem it necessary
to a finding of price unconscionability.50 The court, however, warned of re-
ducing Section 2-302 to a "mathematical ratio formula." 51
By considering price disparity as the most important element of uncon-
scionability, and presumptive of all other elements, Jones presents the
strongest holding to date that gross price-value disparity, absent procedural
abuses, may constitute unconscionability.52 In Kugler, "procedural uncon-
scionability" in the form of fraudulent representations was established with
respect to the testifying consumer representatives. The exorbitant price pre-
sumed it with respect to the non-testifying class members. In this capacity,
the unreasonable price term took on the character of "substantive uncon-
scionability."
' "3
48. 59 Misc. 2d 189, 298 N.Y.S.2d 264 (1969).
49. Id. at 266.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 267.
52. See Speidel, supra note 29, at 369-74. See also Spanogle, supra note 29, at
964-69. The Federal Trade Commission in administering 15 U.S.C. § 45, which pro-
hibits "unfair and deceptive" trade practices has declared that unconscionably high
pricing, by itself, violates the Act. On this point, see Leon A. Tashof, individually
and Trading as New York Jewelry Company, [1967-1970 Transfer Binder] TRADE
REG. REP. (11th ed.) 18,606, at 20,955 (FTC 1968). The holding in Jones is
also consistent with Section 6.111(3)(c) of the Uniform Consumer Credit Code
which provides that "gross disparity between the price" and value shall be considered by
the Administrator as a factor in applying for injunctive relief.
53. Leff, supra note 29, at 509.
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The next level of inquiry is a determination of what makes an exorbitant
price "exorbitant," and how is this to be established. Is it disparity with
cost? Fair market value? Credit charges? The court in Kugler was faced
with a number of considerations in determining price disparity: (1) the
wholesale unit cost to the seller ($35-$40); (2) the maximum retail price
established by expert testimony ($108-110); (3) the value of the item in
terms of its usefulness-likewise determined by expert testimony (worth-
less); (4) the credit charges ($29.50). The Court expressly found price
unconscionability in terms of a retail price, two and one-half times greater
than the maximum retail market price.
It will become apparent that the test employed in Kugler is the only
proper measure of price disparity. In Maclver the disparity was found to
exist between retail price and what the court termed "value". 54 Value was
found to be $959, retail price ($2568.60), less credit charges ($809), less
commission ($800). ITM announced a price disparity test based upon a
wholesale unit cost relationship, in that retail prices varied from two to six
times wholesale unit cost. Frostifresh determined price unconscionabiity
in terms of credit charges approximating wholesale cost. Jones and Toker
based price disparity on a comparison of cash price with "maximum retail
value".
Kugler was in fact based on a Jones-Toker fair market value standard
($108-$110). However, the finding of price unconscionability satisfies the
wholesale unit cost test (ITM) since the cash price ($249) was over six
times the unit cost ($35-$40). Likewise, the Frostifresh credit test can be
met since "the service charge ($29.50) . . . almost equaled the price
(cost-$35-$40)." Maclver's "value" test (time price less interest and com-
mission) is of no moment since the consumers in Kugler were paying $45.50
($29.50 interest plus $16 commission) for goods valued at $108-$110,
clearly not unconscionable under Maclver.
A test based exclusively on fair market value, credit charges, wholesale
cost, or interest plus commission presents a distorted picture. Interest
charges, if within statutory limits, are irrelevant in determining price dis-
parity. They represent the cost to the buyer of postponing the payment of
the cash price. Interest charges are deemed per se reasonable by statute
and are in no way related to the reasonableness of a retail cash price. A
comparison of retail cash price to wholesale unit cost penalizes inefficient
retailers who are faced with high operating costs and commission fees.
54. For a discussion of "value" in Macver, see Comment, Unconscionable Sales
Prices, 20 ME. L. REv. 159, 160 (1969).
[Vol. 22:187
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An initial comparison of the cash price with the average retail market
price charged by similarly situated sellers55 offers a proper measure of dis-
parity. Some commentators have suggested that if a cash price varies from
1.7 to 2 times the average retail market price charged by similarly situated
sellers, it is prima facie unconscionable.56 The burden would then shift to
the seller to justify his price by showing wholesale unit costs, operating
costs, fixed costs, and chattel paper discounts giving rise to a net profit pre-
sumably in accord with that of sellers similarly situated. In Kugler the
prima facie showing of a retail price, two and one-half times greater than
the average market price, was uncontroverted by any evidence of cost justifi-
cation. Indeed, it established that a gross profit margin of approximately
$209, or greater than 80 percent of the cash price, was clearly unconsciona-
ble.
The power of the courts to void contracts containing price terms found to
be unconscionable presents serious questions of public policy. The idea of
permitting courts to fix prices on an ad hoc basis seems utterly repugnant to
the common law sacred cow, "freedom of contract" (but see U.C.C. 2-
305(1). This notion accounts for the reluctance of courts to vitiate con-
tracts on a showing of price disparity and nothing more. Indeed, all the
decisions applying the doctrine of price unconscionability, excluding Jones,
have contained alternative grounds (fraud, illegality etc.) to justify their
holdings. The purpose of Section 2-302, to prevent "oppression and unfair
surprise. .. -57 is best served by considering gross price disparity as an un-
bargained-for, economically oppressive term presumptive of procedural
abuse which Section 2-302 is designed to prevent. One may be troubled
by the holding in Jones that an exorbitant price may be unconscionable
per se. However, the court's treatment of the exorbitant price term in
55. The uncommon nature of the product sold in Kugler (educational materials)
made it necessary to establish an average retail market price by expert testimony. This
method of proof can be effectively utilized to prove the market value of unique goods
which do not exist in a relevant market.
56. See, Speidel, supra note 29, at 372-75 and Zuckman, supra note 27, at 318-19.
57. See Comment 1 to Section 2-302. See also the oft-cited Williams v. Walker-
Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445 (D.C. Cir. 1965). The case involved the sale of
household items secured by a cross-collateral clause of the sales contract. This provi-
sion had the effect of vesting title with the seller by keeping a balance due on all
outstanding purchases. In Williams the United States Court of Appeals for the Dis-
trict of Columbia set out certain elements as conditions precedent in determining the
presence of unconscionability: (1) an absence of meaningful choice, precipitated by a
gross inequality of bargaining power; (2) contractual provisions which are unreason-
ably favorable to the other party; (3) lack of an opportunity to understand the terms
of the contract. Williams, although the leading case on unconscionability, is not
directly applicable since it was confined to enunciating a totality of circumstances test,
and did not deal specifically with price unconscionability per se. It is interesting to
note that Judge Francis cites Williams only once, as supporting MacIver. For satirical
commentary on Williams and Maclver, see LEFF 544-45.
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Kugler may lessen the anxiety, for in Kugler, proof of the procedural abuse
(fraud) by the testifying class representatives was required before the ex-
orbitant price term could be applied substantively. It is in this context,
i.e., the consumer class action, that an exorbitant price term can be applied
substantively in order to grant relief to those consumers "similarly situated"
without sacrificing the sine qua non of procedural abuse in the contract
formation process.
Consumer Class Action
The extensive injunctive and restorative relief granted by the court in Kug-
ler, although receiving impetus from specific statutory authority, 58 is de-
rived, in essence from the class action rationale. The court saw fit to devote
a substantial portion of its opinion to class action considerations in support
of its holding. It recognized the inherent value of the consumer class action
as a deterrent to widespread price gouging and deceptive practices59 per-
petrated on low-income consumers.
The inadequacies of the present system in combating consumer frauds
are self-evident. The effectiveness of governmental agencies such as the
Federal Trade Commission, limited to seeking injunctive relief, and relying
heavily on voluntary compliance, is questionable." Individual private reme-
dies are likewise inept. Private attorneys are dissuaded from taking con-
sumer fraud cases since the amount of the individual claim is relatively in-
significant.1 The superiority of the consumer class action over other means
of redress is founded not only on its potential to provide restorative relief to
defrauded consumers not parties to the action,62 but also on its deterrent ef-
fect,63 enhanced by increased publicity and a greater damage award.
58. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 56:8-8 (1964).
59. Blalock, Unconscionable Consumer Installment Contracts, 54 A.B.A.J. 279
(1968).
60. On this point see Travers & Landers, The Consumer Class Action, 18
U. KAN. L. REv. 811, 812 [hereinafter cited as Travers] (1970); Eckhardt, Con-
sumer Class Actions, 45 NOTRE DAME LAWYER 663, 666 (1970) [hereinafter cited as
Eckhardt]. For a blatant illustration of the inadequacy of the F.T.C. in handling
consumer frauds see Holland Furnace Co., 24 F.T.C. 1413-14 (1936); Holland Fur-
nace Co., 341 F.2d 548 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 924 (1965), in which
the defendant, found to have defrauded consumers in 1936, continued to defraud
consumers for 29 years, retaining profits in the face of an F.T.C. "cease and desist"
order and numerous individual complaints. See Eckhardt 667 for a discussion
of this case. This trend may be turning. See F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchison Co.,
92 S. Ct. 898 (1972).
61. See Eckhardt 663 and Travers 813.
62. See Travers, supra note 60. The authors stress "It is not enough to pass a law
prohibiting or requiring certain conduct; some mechanism must be provided to secure
compliance" at 811.
63. Prof. Starr in an exhaustive, two-part analysis of consumer class actions con-
tained in 49 B.U. L. Rav. 407, 508-09 (1969) suggests "a class action by similarly de-
frauded consumers against their wrongdoers for damages and recission of contracts for
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Consumer Class Action
Most courts are reluctant to sustain consumer class actions,6 4 since they
involve, arguably, separate and distinct transactions. Nevertheless, the Cal-
ifornia Supreme Court in Darr v. Yellow Cab Co.,6 5 and Vasquez v. San
Joaquin,6 has adopted a much more liberal view by sanctioning the "com-
munity of interest test," i.e. whether the issues common to the class are so
important that their adjudication on a class basis will benefit both the liti-
gants and the court. In Vasquez the court reversed a lower court decision
which held that a class action was not properly maintainable, opting for an
approach strikingly similar to that of Kugler. The similarity is contained in
the following, where the Court is of the opinion that proof of the falsity of
the representations is not a hinderance to the establishment of the common
issues. In the words of the Court:
It is also alleged that the representations regarding the freezers
were false, and that the prices charged for them were exorbitant,
excessive and unconscionable, amounting to not less than twice
the reasonable retail price. The falsity of these representations
could be shown on a common basis since proof of the allegations
regarding the quality and price of the freezer purchased by the
named plaintiff would provide proof as to all.
6 7
It is in this context, i.e. the consumer class action, that an exorbitant price
term can be applied substantively as presumptive of procedural abuse. The
reasoning employed by Vasquez is on an equal footing with Kugler. Kugler
and Vasquez recognize that the class action device resolves the fundamental
question of whether gross price disparity is an element of unconscionability
or can be unconscionable in and of itself. The class action employs the ex-
cessive price term in each of its dual capacities; as an element of uncon-
the named parties, as well as broad injunctive relief for a carefully limited class of con-
sumers . . ." can be brought within the present confines of procedure. See also, Dole,
Consumer Class Actions under Recent Consumer Credit Legislation, 44 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 80 (1969). Congressional response to the problems facing the consumer class
action has been limited. But see H.R. 262, 92d Cong. 1st Sess. (unreported Jan.
1971), The Consumer Class Action Act, now pending. The Act confers original
jurisdiction of Federal Courts, to entertain consumer class actions based on violations
of Section 5(a)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act which prohibits unfair and
deceptive acts. The Act would legislatively overrule Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332
(1969) which held that claims of class members could not be aggregated to satisfy
jurisdictional amounts.
64. The New York Court of Appeals in Hall v. Colburn, 26 N.Y.2d 396, 311
N.Y.S.2d 881 (1970), affirmed a lower court decision dismissing a consumer class
action involving violations of the New York Retail Installment Act. For a discussion
of Hall, see Eckhardt, supra note 60, at 664. For the cases in which consumer class
actions were dismissed see Eckhardt, supra note 60, at 666 n.15.
65. 63 Cal. Rptr. 724, 433 P.2d732 (1967).
66. 94 Cal. Rptr. 796, 484 P.2d 964 (1971). In Vasquez the Court sustained a
class action alleging fraud, in which the representatives sought rescission of contracts
for the purchase of freezers.
67. Id. at 971 (emphasis supplied).
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